Wednesday, September 22, 2010
We are living through an exceptional moment in human history: FIDEL CASTRO
Castro says he was misinterpreted on Cuban economy
updated 9/10/2010 4:47:02 PM ET
HAVANA — Fidel Castro said Friday his comments about the Cuban economic model no longer working were misinterpreted by a visiting American journalist — taking back an admission that caused a stir around the globe.
The 84-year-old ex-president said he was not misquoted but meant "the opposite" of what he was reported as having said by The Atlantic magazine reporter Jeffrey Goldberg.
Goldberg wrote Wednesday that during three days of interviews with Castro in Havana last month, he asked the former leader over lunch and wine if Cuba's communist system was still worth exporting to other countries. He said Castro replied: "The Cuban model doesn't even work for us anymore."
Castro read from Goldberg's blog during an event at the University of Havana and said he was misunderstood.
"I expressed it to him without bitterness or worry. It's funny to me now how he interpreted it, word for word, and how he consulted with Julia Sweig, who accompanied him and gave a theory," Castro told those assembled. "The reality is, my answer meant the opposite of what both American journalists interpreted about the Cuban model."
Sweig, a Cuba expert at the Washington-based Council on Foreign Relations who came to Cuba with Goldberg, confirmed Castro's comment earlier this week, telling The Associated Press it was in line with calls by Raul Castro, Fidel's brother and successor as president, for gradual but widespread economic and labor reform on the island.
Goldberg blogged that Sweig told him Raul Castro "is already loosening the state's hold on the economy."
Still, Cuba's former "Maximum Leader" maintained Friday that wasn't what he meant at all.
"My idea, as the whole world knows, is that the capitalist system no long works — neither for the United States nor the world, which it steers from crisis to crisis, which are ever more serious, global and repetitive, and from which there is no escape," Castro said. "How could such a system work for a socialist country like Cuba?"
The comments came during an unveiling at the university of "The Strategic Counter-Offensive," Castro's second book on his revolution that toppled Cuban dictator Fulgencio Batista in 1959 that he has written and released in less than a month.
His tone was not angry, more baffled and even a bit bemused. At one point Castro said, "I continue to think that Goldberg is a great journalist. He doesn't invent phrases, he transmits them and interprets them."
Castro had invited Goldberg to Cuba to discuss Iran — not domestic island politics — and he apparently did not elaborate on his comment about the economy, making it difficult to decipher the meaning.
Still, it made headlines globally: The Guardian newspaper of Britain called it "an aside heard around the world."
Castro said Goldberg missed the irony in his quip and took issue for the same reason with a a Goldberg blog entry from Tuesday, when he wrote that during another conversation, Castro questioned his own actions during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis — including his recommendation to Soviet leaders that they use nuclear weapons against the United States.
Goldberg wrote that with Castro, he revisited the Missile Crisis, asking: "At a certain point it seemed logical for you to recommend that the Soviets bomb the U.S. Does what you recommended still seem logical now?"
He said Castro's answer surprised him: "After I've seen what I've seen, and knowing what I know now, it wasn't worth it all."
"It's true that I broached the subject as (Goldberg) relates," Castro said Friday. But he added that if he had known the true nature of Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev, he would have pushed for another course of action.
Castro said his remark to Goldberg came in "obvious reference to the treachery of the Russian president who, saturated with alcoholic substances, gave the United States all his country's most important military secrets."
Blogging about his trip to Cuba — which included a visit with Castro to the dolphin show at Havana's aquarium — Goldberg said he would post further items and write a longer piece for The Atlantic.
"He didn't mention many other aspects of our conversations," Castro said Friday. "I will respect the confidentiality of the matters we discussed while waiting with great interest his extensive article."
Copyright 2010 The Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed.
Fidel: 'Cuban Model Doesn't Even Work For Us Anymore'
By Jeffrey Goldberg
THE ATLANTIC
There were many odd things about my recent Havana stopover (apart from the dolphin show, which I'll get to shortly), but one of the most unusual was Fidel Castro's level of self-reflection. I only have limited experience with Communist autocrats (I have more experience with non-Communist autocrats) but it seemed truly striking that Castro was willing to admit that he misplayed his hand at a crucial moment in the Cuban Missile Crisis (you can read about what he said toward the end of my previous post - but he said, in so many words, that he regrets asking Khruschev to nuke the U.S.).
Even more striking was something he said at lunch on the day of our first meeting. We were seated around a smallish table; Castro, his wife, Dalia, his son; Antonio; Randy Alonso, a major figure in the government-run media; and Julia Sweig, the friend I brought with me to make sure, among other things, that I didn't say anything too stupid (Julia is a leading Latin American scholar at the Council on Foreign Relations). I initially was mainly interested in watching Fidel eat - it was a combination of digestive problems that conspired to nearly kill him, and so I thought I would do a bit of gastrointestinal Kremlinology and keep a careful eye on what he took in (for the record, he ingested small amounts of fish and salad, and quite a bit of bread dipped in olive oil, as well as a glass of red wine). But during the generally lighthearted conversation (we had just spent three hours talking about Iran and the Middle East), I asked him if he believed the Cuban model was still something worth exporting.
"The Cuban model doesn't even work for us anymore," he said.
This struck me as the mother of all Emily Litella moments. Did the leader of the Revolution just say, in essence, "Never mind"?
I asked Julia to interpret this stunning statement for me. She said, "He wasn't rejecting the ideas of the Revolution. I took it to be an acknowledgment that under 'the Cuban model' the state has much too big a role in the economic life of the country."
Julia pointed out that one effect of such a sentiment might be to create space for his brother, Raul, who is now president, to enact the necessary reforms in the face of what will surely be push-back from orthodox communists within the Party and the bureaucracy. Raul Castro is already loosening the state's hold on the economy. He recently announced, in fact, that small businesses can now operate and that foreign investors could now buy Cuban real estate. (The joke of this new announcement, of course, is that Americans are not allowed to invest in Cuba, not because of Cuban policy, but because of American policy. In other words, Cuba is beginning to adopt the sort of economic ideas that America has long-demanded it adopt, but Americans are not allowed to participate in this free-market experiment because of our government's hypocritical and stupidly self-defeating embargo policy. We'll regret this, of course, when Cubans partner with Europeans and Brazilians to buy up all the best hotels).
But I digress. Toward the end of this long, relaxed lunch, Fidel proved to us that he was truly semi-retired. The next day was Monday, when maximum leaders are expected to be busy single-handedly managing their economies, throwing dissidents into prison, and the like. But Fidel's calendar was open. He asked us, "Would you like to go the aquarium with me to see the dolphin show?"
I wasn't sure I heard him correctly. (This happened a number of times during my visit). "The dolphin show?"
"The dolphins are very intelligent animals," Castro said.
I noted that we had a meeting scheduled for the next morning, with Adela Dworin, the president of Cuba's Jewish community."Bring her," Fidel said.Someone at the table mentioned that the aquarium was closed on Mondays. Fidel said, "It will be open tomorrow."
And so it was.
Late the next morning, after collecting Adela at the synagogue, we met Fidel on the steps of the dolphin house. He kissed Dworin, not incidentally in front of the cameras (another message for Ahmadinejad, perhaps). We went together into a large, blue-lit room that faces a massive, glass-enclosed dolphin tank. Fidel explained, at length, that the Havana Aquarium's dolphin show was the best dolphin show in the world, "completely unique," in fact, because it is an underwater show. Three human divers enter the water, without breathing equipment, and perform intricate acrobatics with the dolphins.
"Do you like dolphins?" Fidel asked me.
"I like dolphins a lot," I said.
Fidel called over Guillermo Garcia, the director of the aquarium (every employee of the aquarium, of course, showed up for work -- "voluntarily," I was told) and told him to sit with us."Goldberg," Fidel said, "ask him questions about dolphins."
"What kind of questions?" I asked
"You're a journalist, ask good questions," he said, and then interrupted himself. "He doesn't know much about dolphins anyway," he said, pointing to Garcia. He's actually a nuclear physicist."
"You are?" I asked.
"Yes," Garcia said, somewhat apologetically.
"Why are you running the aquarium?" I asked
"We put him here to keep him from building nuclear bombs!" Fidel said, and then cracked-up laughing.
"In Cuba, we would only use nuclear power for peaceful means," Garcia said, earnestly.
"I didn't think I was in Iran," I answered.
Fidel pointed to the small rug under the special swivel chair his bodyguards bring along for him. "It's Persian!" he said, and laughed again.
Then he said, "Goldberg, ask your questions about dolphins."
Now on the spot, I turned to Garcia and asked, "How much do the dolphins weigh?"
"They weigh between 100 and 150 kilograms," he said
"How do you train the dolphins to do what they do?" I asked.
"That's a good question," Fidel said.
Garcia called over one of the aquarium's veterinarians to help answer the question. Her name was Celia. A few minutes later, Antonio Castro told me her last name: Guevara
"You're Che's daughter?" I asked.
"Yes," she said.
"And you're a dolphin veterinarian?"
"I take care of all the inhabitants of the aquarium," she said.
"Che liked animals very much," Antonio Castro said.
It was time for the show to start. The lights dimmed, and the divers entered the water. Without describing it overly much, I will say that once again, and to my surprise, I found myself agreeing with Fidel: The aquarium in Havana puts on a fantastic dolphin show, the best I've ever seen, and as the father of three children, I've seen a lot of dolphin shows. I will also say this: I've never seen someone enjoy a dolphin show as much as Fidel Castro enjoyed the dolphin show.
In the next installment, I will deal with such issues as the American embargo, the status of religion in Cuba, the plight of political dissidents, and economic reform. For now, I leave you with this image from our day at the aquarium (I'm in the low chair; Che's daughter is behind me, with the short, blondish hair; Fidel is the guy who looks like Fidel if Fidel shopped at L.L. Bean):
This article available online at:
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2010/09/fidel-cuban-model-doesnt-even-work-for-us-anymore/62602/
A Copyright © 2010 by The Atlantic Monthly Group. All Rights Reserved.
Tuesday, February 24, 2009
A NECESSARY INTRODUCTION OF BOLIVIAN DIARY by FIDEL CASTRO
Once again, thanks to Che's enduring habit of noting the principal events of each day, we have access to priceless information, detailed and rigorously exact, about those last heroic months of his life in Bolivia.
He constantly used these notes, which were not really intended for publication, as a tool with which to evaluate events, men and the general situation. They also provided an outlet for his acutely observant and analytical spirit, which was often tinged with a keen sense of humour. He kept up the habit so conscientiously that the notes remain coherent from beginning to end.
It must be remembered that this diary was written during extremely rare moments of rest from superhuman and back-breaking physical effort, without mentioning Che's exhausting responsibilities as a guerrilla leader during the difficult early days of this form of struggle which unfolded in particularly hard material circumstances; this goes to show once again the kind of man Che was, and his strength of will.
There are detailed analyses of each day's incidents in this diary, exposing the errors, criticisms and recriminations, which are an inevitable part of any revolutionary guerrilla.
Criticisms of this sort have to be made incessantly in a guerrilla detachment, especially during the first stage, when there is only a small nucleus of men who are permanently exposed to extremely adverse material conditions and an enemy which is far superior in number; at such times, the least oversight, the most insignificant error of judgement, can be fatal, and the chief has to be very exacting. He must turn each event or minor incident, however trivial, into a lesson for fighters and future leaders of new guerrilla detachments.
The training of a guerrilla force makes constant demands on the honour and conscience of each man. Che knew how to touch the most sensitive cords in a revolutionary's heart. When he told Marcos, after repeated warnings, that he might have to give him a dishonourable discharge, Marcos replied, ' I'd rather you shot me! ' Later on, Marcos bravely gave up his life. All the men in whom Che placed his trust and yet had to admonish for one reason or another in the course of the struggle, felt the same way as Marcos. Che was a humane and comradely leader who also knew when to be demanding, even severe at times. But he was always far harder on himself than on others and he based his discipline on the moral conscience of the guerrillas and on the tremendous force of his personal example.
There are numerous references to Regis Debray in the diary which show Che's great concern over the arrest and imprisonment of the revolutionary writer to whom he had entrusted a mission in Europe, although he would in fact have preferred Debray to stay with the guerrillas. This explains why there is a certain inconsistency about his attitude and why he even voices some doubts concerning Debray's behaviour.
Che never knew what Debray had to endure while in the clutches of the forces of repression, and the firm, courageous stance with which he confronted his captors and tormentors.
However, Che did realize the immense political significance of Debray's trial and. on October 3rd, just a few days before his death, during tense and bitter moments Che noted: ' We heard an interview with Debray, very bravely confronting a student who provoked him.' This was his last reference to the writer.
Just because Che often refers to the Cuban Revolution and its connection with the guerrilla movement, there are some who might interpret the publication of his diary as an act of provocation on our part, something that will give the enemies of the Revolution, the Yankee imperialists and their allies, the oligarchies of Latin America, a pretext for redoubling their attempts to isolate, blockade and attack Cuba.
Those who think this must not forget that Yankee imperialism has never felt the need for any excuse to carry out its misdeeds anywhere in the world, and that its efforts to destroy the Cuban Revolution date from the first revolutionary law promulgated in our country; for everyone knows that imperialism acts as a policeman for all that is reactionary and is the systematic promoter of counter-revolution, protecting the most backward and inhuman social structures in the world.
Yankee aggression may use our solidarity with the revolutionary movement as a pretext to attack us, but this will never be the true cause. To deny solidarity in order to eliminate the pretext would be an absurd, ostrich-like policy totally alien to the international nature of today's social revolutions. To disown our solidarity with the revolutionary movement would not just mean denying the pretext, but would actually be tantamount to supporting Yankee imperialism and its policy of world enslavement and domination.
Cuba is a small and economically underdeveloped country, like all countries which have been dominated and exploited by colonialism and imperialism for centuries. It is only 90 miles away from the coast of the United States, and has a Yankee naval base on its territory. There are many economic and social obstacles to its development. Our country has known periods of great danger since our victorious Revolution, but that will not make us yield or weaken; a consistent line of revolutionary conduct is impervious to hardships.
From a revolutionary point of view, we have no option but to publish the diary Che wrote in Bolivia. The diary fell into Barrientos's hands and he immediately sent off copies to the CIA, the Pentagon and the United States government. Journalists on good terms with the CIA were allowed to see the document in Bolivia and to have photostat copies made of it — but only after promising not to publish it for the time being.
The Barrientos government and its top military chiefs have good reasons for not wanting the diary to be published, since it shows up the incredible inefficiency of the Bolivian army, defeated over and over again by a handful of determined guerrillas who captured nearly 200 arms in battle within a few weeks.
Che also describes Barrientos and his regime in terms which they richly deserve and that cannot be erased from history.
Imperialism also has personal reasons of its own: Che and his extraordinary example are constantly growing in strength throughout the world. His ideas, his portrait and his name are banners in the struggle against injustice by the oppressed and the exploited and they arouse passionate enthusiasm in students and intellectuals everywhere.
Even in the United States, the Negro movement and the ever-increasing number of radical students have adopted Che's image. His photographs are paraded as emblems of the struggle in the most militant civil rights marches and demonstrations against the aggression in Vietnam. Rarely, if ever, in history has one man's image, name and example spread so rapidly and so completely. The reason is that Che stood for the spirit of internationalism in its purest and most disinterested form, and it is this spirit which characterizes the world of today and, even more so, the world of tomorrow.
This amazing figure who symbolizes world-wide revolutionary struggle even in the capitals of the imperialist and colonial world came from a continent which was once oppressed by colonial powers and which is now exploited and kept in the most criminal state of underdevelopment by Yankee imperialism.
The Yankee imperialists are frightened of Che's potent example and of everything that helps to spread his reputation. This is the greatest value of the diary: it is the living expression of an extraordinary personality, a lesson for guerrilla fighters written in the heat and suspense of each day. That is what makes it explosive; it is the proof that men in Latin America are not helpless against those who try to enslave them with mercenary armies; that is what has stopped the imperialists from publishing the diary.
It could well be that many so-called revolutionaries, opportunists and impostors of every sort, who call themselves Marxists, Communists and a variety of other names, would also prefer the diary to remain unknown. They do not hesitate to dismiss Che as a deluded adventurer, or at best an idealist, claiming that his death was the swansong of revolutionary armed struggle in Latin America. ' If Che, the greatest exponent of such ideas and an experienced guerrilla fighter was lulled in a guerrilla war and if his movement did not liberate Bolivia, that proves he was completely wrong! ' That is the way they argue; and how many of those miserable characters rejoiced at the news of Che's death, not even ashamed that their position and their reasoning coincided perfectly with those of the most reactionary oligarchies and with. imperialism!
They reasoned like this to justify themselves or to justify treacherous leaders who did not hesitate occasionally to pretend to endorse armed struggle while in fact — as has been discovered since — their true purpose was to destroy guerrilla movements in the bud, to slow down all revolutionary action, and to put in its place their own absurd and despicable political deals, being utterly incapable of taking any other line of conduct. They also needed to justify those who lacked the will to fight and who will never fight for the liberation of their people, but who have turned revolutionary ideology into a caricature of itself, until it is nothing more than a dogma and an opiate without any genuine meaning or message for the masses. Such men have converted the organizations for the struggle of the masses into instruments of conciliation with both foreign and domestic exploiters and advocates of policies that go against the interests of the exploited Latin-American people.
Che envisaged death as a natural and probable part of the process, and he tried, especially in his last documents, to underline the fact that this eventuality could not slow down the inevitable march of Revolution in Latin America. He emphasized this in his message to the Tricontinental Congress: ' Our every action is a battle cry against imperialism... wherever death may surprise us, let it be welcome so long as our battle cry may have reached some receptive ear and another hand may reach out to pick up our weapons.'
Che looked upon himself as a soldier of the revolution and never worried about surviving it. Those who imagine that Che's ideas failed because of the outcome of the struggle in Bolivia might as well use this simplistic argument to say that many of the great revolutionary precursors and revolutionary thinkers, including the founders of Marxism, were also failures because they were unable to see the culmination of their life's work and died before their noble efforts were crowned with success.
In Cuba, the ultimate triumph of a process which was set into motion 100 years ago was not halted by the deaths of Marti and Maceo in combat, followed by the Yankee intervention at the end of the War of Independence which frustrated the immediate objective of their struggle, nor was it halted by the assassination of a brilliant theoretician of socialist revolution like Julio Antonio Mella, murdered by agents in the service of imperialism. And absolutely no one can doubt the rightness of these great men's cause and line of conduct, or the validity of their basic ideas which have always served as an inspiration to Cuban revolutionaries.
We can see from Che's diary how genuine was the possibility of success and what an extraordinary catalyst the guerrilla proved to be. On one occasion, observing obvious symptoms of weakness and rapid decline in the Bolivian regime, he noted: ' The government is disintegrating rapidly; what a pity we do not have 100 more men right now.'
Che knew from his Cuban experience how many times our small guerrilla detachment was on the point of being exterminated. It could have happened because, in war, one depends so much on chance and circumstances. And if it had happened, would it have given anybody the right to say that our line of conduct had been wrong, using our example to discourage revolution and inculcate people with a sense of helplessness? The revolutionary process has known setbacks many times in history. Did we not, in Cuba, experience Moncada only six years before the final triumph of our people's armed struggle?
Between the attack of July 26th, 1953, on the Moncada Fortress and the Granma landing on December 2nd, 1956, there were many who believed that the revolutionary struggle in Cuba was hopeless, that a handful of fighters would not stand a chance against a modern and well-equipped army, and that those fighters could only be looked upon as idealists and dreamers ' who were utterly wrong.' The terrible defeat and the total dispersal of the inexperienced guerrilla detachment on December 5th, 1956, seemed to prove the pessimists' point of view completely. But, only twenty-five months later, the remnants of that guerrilla force had acquired enough strength and experience to rout the army totally.
There will be good excuses not to fight at all times and in every circumstance, and that will be the surest way never to win freedom. Che did not outlive his ideas, but he gave them added strength by shedding his blood for them. His pseudo-revolutionary critics, with their political cowardice and their permanent lack of action, will quite certainly live to see the day when their stupidity will be exposed.
It will be noticed in this diary that one of these revolutionary specimens becoming more and more common in Latin America, Mario Monje, brandishing his title of Secretary of the Communist Party of Bolivia, disputed with Che the political and military leadership of the movement. He went on to say that, for this, he would resign his party position, and seemed to think that it was quite enough to have once held such a title to claim the prerogative.
Needless to say. Mario Monje had no guerrilla experience and had never fought a combat in his life; without mentioning the fact that his personal notion of Communism should have rid him of such narrow and vulgar chauvinism long before then, just as our ancestors got rid of it to fight the first round for Independence.
If this is their concept of what the anti-imperialist struggle on this continent should be, then these so-called ' Communist leaders ' have not progressed further in the notion of internationalism than the Indian tribes which were conquered by the colonisers.
And so, this Communist Party boss proceeded to make ridiculous, shameful and undeserved claims for leadership in a country called Bolivia, with a historic capital called Sucre, both named in honour of the first liberators who came from Venezuela; and Bolivia owed its final liberation to the political, military and organizational talent of an authentic revolutionary genius who did not limit his beliefs to the narrow, artificial and even unjust frontiers of that country.
Bolivia does not have an outlet to the sea; if it were liberated, it would need the revolutionary victory of its neighbours more than any other country so as not to be subjected to the most intolerable blockade. And Che was the man who could have accelerated the process with his tremendous prestige, abilities and experience.
Che had established relations with Bolivian Communist leaders and militants before the split that occurred within the Party, calling on them to help the revolutionary movement in South America. Some of those militants, with the party's permission, collaborated with him on various tasks for years. The party split created a new situation in which the militants who had worked with Che found themselves in different camps. But Che did not look upon the struggle in Bolivia as an isolated cause; he saw it as part of a revolutionary movement for liberation which would soon extend to other countries of South America. His aim was to organize a movement that would be free of sectarianism and that could be joined by all those who wanted to fight for the liberation of Bolivia and other Latin American countries subjected to imperialism. During the initial phase of preparation for a guerrilla base, however, Che had relied chiefly on the aid of a courageous and discreet group which remained in Monje's party after the split. It was out of deference to them that he first invited Monje to visit the camp, although he felt no sympathy for him whatsoever. Later, Che also invited Moisés Guevara, the political leader of the miners who had left Monje's party to help create another organization. from which he finally had to withdraw as well because he disagreed with Oscar Zamora. Zamora, another Monje, had agreed to work with Che in organizing armed guerrilla warfare in Bolivia, but he later withdrew his support and sat back like a coward when the hour for action had struck. In the name of ' Marxist-Leninism,' Zamora became one of Che's most vicious critics after his death, while Moisés Guevara unhesitatingly joined Che, as he had agreed to do long before Che came to Bolivia, offering his support and heroically giving up his life to the revolutionary cause.
The group of Bolivian guerrilla fighters, who had remained loyal to Monje's organization until then, did the same. Directed by Inti and Coco Peredo, who later proved their courage and their worth as combatants, they broke away from Monje and became staunch supporters of Che. But Monje was not pleased with the outcome and began to sabotage the movement, dissuading militant and well-trained Communists from going to join the guerrilla. Actions of this nature show how incompetent leaders who are impostors and manipulators can criminally check the development within the revolutionary framework of men who are completely ready and able to fight.
Che was a man who never took any personal interest in rank, position or honours, but he was absolutely convinced of one thing: that in revolutionary guerrilla warfare, which is the basic form of action needed to liberate the peoples of Latin America given the economic, political and social condition of almost all those countries, the military and political leadership of the guerrilla has to be unified and the struggle can only be led from within the guerrilla and not from comfortable bureaucratic offices in the cities. He was determined not to give in on this point or to hand over to an inexperienced blockhead with narrow, chauvinistic views, the leadership of a guerrilla nucleus, which was ultimately destined to spread the struggle across all of South America. Che felt that chauvinism, which so often contaminates even the revolutionary elements in various Latin American countries, was something to be fought against, an absurdly reactionary and sterile attitude. As he said in his message to the Tricontinental: ' And let us develop a true proletarian internationalism... the flag under which we fight would be the sacred cause of redeeming humanity. To die under the flag of Vietnam, of Venezuela, of Guatemala, of Laos, of Guinea, of Colombia, of Bolivia, of Brazil — to name only a few scenes of today's armed struggle — would be equally glorious and desirable for an American. an Asian, an African, even a European. Each drop of blood spilt by a man in any country under whose flag he was not born is an experience passed on to those who survive, to be added later to the Liberation struggle of his country. And each nation liberated is a phase won in the battle for the liberation of one's own country.'
Che also believed that fighters from different Latin American countries should participate in the development of the guerrilla and that Bolivia's guerrilla force ought to act as a school for revolutionaries who would learn in combat. To help him in this task he needed, along with the Bolivians, a small nucleus of experienced guerrillas, nearly all of them his comrades in the Sierra Maestra at the time of Cuba's revolutionary war; he knew the aptitudes, courage and spirit of sacrifice of these men, and not one of them failed him in his demands, abandoned him or surrendered.
Throughout the Bolivian campaign, Che displayed those exemplary qualities of endurance, ability and stoicism, for which he was so rightly famous. It can truly be said that, knowing the importance of the task he had set out to accomplish, he proceeded to go about it with the most faultless sense of responsibility at all times. On every occasion that the guerrilla acted carelessly, he quickly took the fact into account, corrected it, and set it down in his diary.
The most incredible succession of adverse factors combined against Che, such as the loss of contact with a group of his fighters containing several valuable men, some of them ill, others convalescing. The separation, which was only intended to last for a few days, was drawn out interminably for months, during which Che made every effort to find them over extremely difficult terrain. During this period, his asthma became a serious problem; normally, a simple medicine would have kept it under control easily, but without that medicine, it became a terrible enemy which attacked him mercilessly. This occurred because the stores of medicine wisely stocked by the guerrilla were discovered and seized by the enemy. The evolution of the struggle was gravely affected by this event as well as by the liquidation, at the end of August, of the group with which Che had lost contact. Yet Che managed to overcome his physical deterioration with a will of steel, and he never allowed it to affect his morale or to stand in the way of action.
Che repeatedly came into contact with the Bolivian peasants and he could not have been surprised by their extremely wary and distrustful nature, as he had had dealings with them on other occasions and knew their mentality well. He realized that it would be a long, difficult and patient job to win them over to his cause, but he never doubted for a moment that he would succeed in the end.
If we examine the sequence of events carefully, we will see that even in September, a few weeks before Che's death, when the number of men on whom he could rely had dwindled drastically, the guerrilla still maintained its capacity for development and some of the Bolivian cadres, such as the brothers Inti and Coco Peredo, were beginning to show terrific potential as leaders. But the Higueras ambush, the only successful army action against Che's detachment, proved to be an irreversible setback for the guerrilla. This action killed off the advance party and wounded several men as they were moving in broad daylight to another zone where the peasants were more developed politically. This objective is not mentioned in the diary, but survivors have testified that it was their goal. Of course, it was dangerous to advance by day along a road they had been following for several days, inevitably coming into contact with local people, in an area which was new to them. And it must have seemed obvious that the army would try to stop them somewhere along the way. But Che, fully conscious of the risk he was running, decided to try his luck so as to help the doctor who was in very bad physical shape.
The day before the ambush, Che wrote: ' We reached Pujio but there were people there who had seen us the day before, which means that news of us has spread by word of mouth.' ' It is becoming dangerous to march with the mules, but I want the Doctor to travel as comfortably as possible as he is very weak.'
The following day, he wrote: ' At 13:00, the advance party left to try and reach Jagüey and to make a decision there about the mules and the Doctor.' In other words, Che was trying to find a solution concerning the sick man in order to abandon their route and take necessary precautions. But that same afternoon, before reaching Jagüey, the advance party fell into the fatal ambush from which the detachment never recovered.
A few days later, encircled in the Yuro ravine, Che fought his last combat.
What this handful of revolutionaries accomplished remains extremely impressive. Even their struggle against the hostile environment they had selected is an unforgettable saga of heroism. Never before in history had such a small number of men set out on such a gigantic undertaking. Their faith, their absolute conviction that the great revolutionary process could be triggered off in Latin America, their confidence and determination as they went to accomplish this objective, give us some idea of their stature.
Once Che said to the guerrilla fighters of Bolivia: ' This form of struggle gives us the opportunity to turn ourselves into revolutionaries, the highest state a man can reach; but it also allows us to graduate as men; those who cannot reach either of these two states must say so and give up the struggle.'
The men who fought with him until the end proved they deserved both of these titles. They symbolize the kind of revolutionaries and men which history needs right now for a really difficult and arduous mission: the revolutionary transformation of Latin America.
During the first fight for independence, the enemy our ancestors fought was a decadent colonial power. The enemy which today's revolutionaries have to reckon with is the most powerful bastion of the imperialist camp, the most highly advanced, technically and industrially. It was this enemy which re-organized and re-equipped the army of Bolivia after the people had crushed the previous repressive military forces. It was this enemy which immediately sent weapons and military advisers to fight against the guerrilla, just as it always has given military and technical aid to every force of repression on this continent. And if that does not suffice, this enemy intervenes directly and sends in troops, as happened in Santo Domingo.
You need the kind of revolutionaries and men that Che described to fight against such an enemy. Without such revolutionaries and men, ready to do what they did, without their spiritual strength to tackle the vast obstacles in their way, without their permanent readiness to die at any moment, without their profound belief in the justness of their cause, without their utter faith in the invincible strength of the people, faced with the might of Yankee imperialism as it throws its military, technical and economic weight around in every corner of the world, the liberation of the peoples of this continent will never be accomplished.
The people themselves in North America are beginning to realize that the monstrous political superstructure which governs their country has for quite a time been totally different from the idyllic bourgeois republic which its founders established nearly two hundred years ago. Their distress grows as they watch the moral barbarism of an irrational, alienating, dehumanized and brutal system which is making an ever-increasing number of victims among the citizens of the U. S., through aggressive wars, political crimes and racial folly; they see human beings turned into mere cogs of a machine; they see the disgusting way in which economic, scientific and human resources are squandered on a vast, reactionary and repressive military apparatus when three-quarters of the world is underdeveloped and hungry.
But only the revolutionary transformation of Latin America would enable the people of the United States to settle their private score with imperialism, while at the same time the growing revolt within the U. S. itself against imperialist policy could become a decisive factor in the revolutionary struggle of Latin America.
And if this half of the American continent does not undergo a profound revolutionary transformation, the fantastic inequality which presently exists between the two halves of the continent will continue to increase. This imbalance began at the turn of the century, when the U. S. rapidly industrialized, and at the same rate, acquired imperial aspirations as it followed the dynamic course of its own social and economic evolution. Meanwhile, the other Balkanized nations of the American continent remained weak and stagnant, submissively yielding to the yoke of feudal oligarchies and their reactionary armies. In another twenty years, this terrible inequality will have increased a hundredfold, not just economically, scientifically and technically, but above all politically.
If this goes on, we will become progressively poorer, weaker, more dependent on, and enslaved by imperialism. This sombre prospect looms over all the underdeveloped nations of Africa and Asia as well.
If the industrialized and educated nations of Europe, with their Common Market and their pooled scientific institutes, are worrying about getting left behind and are afraid of becoming the economic colonies of Yankee imperialism, what does the future have in store for the people of Latin America?
Perhaps some liberal or bourgeois reformist or pseudo-revolutionary impostor, incapable of action, has found a solution to this genuine and incontestable situation which decisively affects the destiny of our people; if so, let him speak up. Let him tell us what he proposes in place of a profound and urgent revolutionary transformation, one which would polarize all the moral, material and human resources needed in this part of the world to make up for the economic, scientific and technical backwardness of centuries, even greater when we compare it to the industrialized world which makes us and will go on making us its serfs, especially the United States. If he can produce the magic formula which will accomplish this in a different way. which will wipe out the oligarchies, the despots, the petty politicians, all the lackeys of the Yankee monopolies, their masters, and if his solution can be applied as rapidly as circumstances require, then let him raise his hand and challenge Che.
But no one has proposed an honest alternative or a consequent line of conduct which would give genuine hope to the 300 million human beings, most of them desperately poor, who make up the population of Latin America; not forgetting that those 300 million will have become 600 million within the next 25 years, all of whom have a right to a decent living, a culture and civilization. It would therefore be more decorous to fall silent before the gesture made by Che and by those who fell at his side, courageously defending his ideas. Because of what that handful of men did, their noble ideal, which was to redeem a continent, will remain the highest proof of what will-power, heroism and human greatness can do. It is their example, which will awaken the conscience of the Latin American people in the struggle to come; Che's heroic call will reach the receptive ears of the poor and the exploited for whom he gave his life. And many hands will stretch out to pick up weapons and to conquer freedom once and for all.
Che wrote his last lines on October 7 th. On the following day, at 13:00 hours, in a narrow ravine where they had decided to wait until nightfall to break out of the encirclement, a large enemy troop made contact with them. Although reduced in number, the group of men who now made up the detachment fought heroically until dusk, from individual positions on the floor of the ravine and on ledges higher up, against the mass of soldiers who had surrounded and attacked them. There were no survivors among those who were fighting close to Che. Near him were the doctor, whose very bad state of health he had noted earlier, and a Peruvian fighter also in extremely poor physical condition; it therefore seems most likely that Che was doing everything in his power to protect the retreat of these two comrades to a safer place, until he himself was wounded. The doctor was not killed during this fight, but several days later, quite near the Yuro ravine. The guerrillas had great difficulty locating each other visually, because the terrain was so irregular and rocky. At times, they could not see one another at all. Some of the men, including Inti Peredo, who were defending the other entrance of the ravine several hundred metres from Che, held off the attack until dark and were then able to slip away from the enemy, heading for the spot where they had prearranged to meet.
It has been established that Che, although wounded, continued to fight until the barrel of his M-2 was destroyed by a bullet, making it totally useless. The pistol he was carrying did not have a magazine. It was only due to these incredible circumstances that they were able to catch him alive. The wounds in his legs, although not fatal, made it impossible for him to walk unaided.
He was taken to the village of Higueras and remained alive for another 24 hours, more or less. He refused to say a single word to his captors and slapped a drunken officer who tried to taunt him.
Barrientos, Ovanda and other top military chiefs met in La Paz and decided, in cold blood, to assassinate Che. The way they proceeded to carry out this underhand agreement in the school of Higueras is now known. Major Miguel Ayoroa and Colonel Andrés Selnich, two Rangers trained by the Yankees, ordered a non-commissioned officer, Mario Terán, to murder Che. Terán went in. completely drunk, and Che. who had heard the shots which had just killed a Bolivian and a Peruvian fighter, seeing the brute hesitate said to him firmly, ' Shoot. Don't be afraid.' Terán left the room and his superiors, Ayoroa and Selnich, had to repeat the order which he finally carried out, firing his machine-gun at Che from the waist down. The official tale that Che had died a few hours after the combat was already in circulation; this was why his executioners gave orders not to shoot him in the chest or the head, so as not to produce instantly fatal wounds. Che's agony was thus cruelly prolonged until a sergeant, who was also drunk, finally killed him with a pistol shot in the left side. The whole procedure was in brutal contrast with the respect Che never once failed to show for the life of the many Bolivian officers and soldiers he had taken prisoner.
Those last hours of his life, spent in the hands of his despicable enemies, must have been bitter for him; but no man was better prepared than Che to face an ordeal of this kind.
We cannot, for the time being, reveal how this diary fell into our hands; it is enough to say that we did not have to pay anyone anything for it. It contains all the entries written down by Che from November 7th. 1966, the day on which he arrived at the Ñacahuasu, until October 7th, 1967, the night before the combat in the Yuro ravine. Only a few pages are missing which are not yet in our possession, but they are entries for dates when nothing important happened, and they in no way alter the diary's overall contents.
Although there is not the slightest doubt about the document's authentically, all photostat copies of it were rigorously examined, not just to establish that they were genuine, but also to see if there were any discrepancies, however minor. The dates were also checked against those in the diary of one surviving guerrilla fighter. The detailed testimony of all the remaining survivors, who were present at these events, provided us with further proof of the diary's accuracy. We are utterly convinced that all the photostats were authentic copies of pages from Che's diary - Che's wife and comrade, Aleida March, greatly helped in the laborious and exhausting task of deciphering his minute and difficult handwriting.
The diary will be published almost simultaneously by the publisher Francois Maspero in France, Feltrinelli in Italy, Trikont Verlag in the German Federal Republic and Ramparts magazine in the U.S.A. There will be Spanish editions by Ruedo Ibérico in France and Revista Punto Final in Chile, as well as in other countries.
¡Hasta la Victoria Siempre!
READ 'BOLIVIAN DIARY' OF ERNESTO CHE GUEVARA : http://chehasta.narod.ru/bd_con.htm
Thursday, February 12, 2009
Voices from the Sierra Maestra: Fidel Castro's Revolutionary Propaganda
On 5 November 1956, 82 Cuban revolutionaries based in Mexico boarded a broken-down yacht named La Granma and headed for Cuba. Seven days later the yacht ran aground near the Los Colorados beach in Cuba's Oriente Province. The landing was well south of the force's link-up site, where 50 supporters awaited their arrival. Government warships patrolled the coast, and government planes flew overhead. The element of surprise was not a factor.
Three days later, soldiers, tipped off by a local peasant, surrounded the revolutionists and almost annihilated them. From 12 to 20 of the guerrillas survived and escaped to the Sierra Maestra Mountains to continue their fight against Cuban dictator and strongman Fulgencio Batista.1 Twenty-four months later the survivors formed the nucleus of a rebel army that marched to Havana to form a revolutionary government that continues to shape international relations in the Western Hemisphere.
How did this small group of guerrillas eventually defeat an army of 30,000 soldiers who were well equipped and had unchecked power over the Cuban citizenry? How did the United States, one of only two superpowers at the time, allow a nation 90 miles from its southern coast to slip from its grasp during the height of the zero sum game of the Cold War?
The answers to these questions lie in the guerrilla's use of propaganda and political warfare. The propaganda campaign that Fidel Castro and his followers waged set the conditions in Cuba and internationally. The campaign helped them gain Cuban society's favor and prevented an international (specifically an American) reaction to the insurrection and, ultimately, led to the rebels' victory. The Cuban Revolution's propagan-da and political warfare, when examined in its original context, illustrates a well-planned and executed psychological operation (PSYOP) that influenced numerous target audiences and led to behavioral changes that helped Castro seize power while commanding a numerically and technologically inferior force.
Batista Seizes Power
On 10 March 1952, Batista seized power in Cuba for the third time in 19 years. He voided the results of the recent election and appointed himself chief executive, prime minister, and head of the Cuban Armed Forces. Political groups throughout Cuba rejected the coup, but none protested more vehemently than did student groups at the University of Havana. Castro, by then a practicing lawyer, legally challenged the coup and called for a 100-year jail sentence for Batista. However, Castro's brief was thrown out by the federal courts.2 Castro continued to work to unite the factions that opposed Batista. One student group, the Santamaría, published a mimeographed underground paper titled Son Los Mismos.3 Castro frequently published articles in the paper condemning the Batista government, and in May 1952 he suggested that the group change the name of the paper to El Acusador.
Castro's group of students and young leaders later became the nucleus of the 26th of July movement (M-26-7), which favored direct action against Batista's dictatorial government. The group began military training in 1953 and set its sights on direct military action against the Cuban government. The location of the action would be the Moncada Army Barracks of Santiago de Cuba.
On 26 July 1953, the group attacked the Barracks. The armed Revolution against Batista had begun. Government forces quickly defeated the attack, and Castro's group was forced to retreat. They headed toward the Sierra Maestra Mountains where they sought refuge and strengthened their numbers to continue the fight.
Government forces tracked the rebels and eventually captured all of them. Several were put to death while sheer "luck and public opinion spared the lives of Fidel, Raul [Castro], and some of [their] closest associates."4 Cubans were outraged at the summary execution without trial of many of the rebels. This consternation benefited Castro, prevented his death, and allowed him a trial in the courts.
While imprisoned, Castro decided that to conduct a successful revolution against the Batista regime he would have to launch the Revolution from another country. Thus, after his release, he went to Mexico, where he reunited with Raul. Raul had already begun planning the invasion from Mexico and had organized supporters and recruited revolutionary-minded men to form a guerrilla army. He introduced Castro to Ernesto "Che" Guevara, an Argentine doctor, who played an important role in the Cuban Revolution and the propaganda implemented during the struggle.5 On 25 November 1956, Castro and 82 others boarded La Granma and set sail for Cuba.
Psychological Operations
The term psychological operations was coined in U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 33-5, Psychological Operations, in January 1962.6 The term has since been defined in Joint Publication (JP) 3-53, Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations, as "operations planned to convey selected information and indicators to audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of governments, organizations, groups, and individuals."7 The term used in the PSYOP community for these is "target audience." Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, defines a target audience as "an individual or group selected for influence or attack by means of psychological operations."8
Field Manual 3-05.30, Psychological Operation's, defines two types of PSYOP programs—an action program and a product program.9 Action programs are "sequential, coordinated presentations of a series of actions to achieve a specific PSYOP objective."10 A product program is a "sequential, coordinated presen-tation of a series of products to achieve a specific PSYOP objective."11 Finally, JP 1-02 defines a PSYOP action as "an action or activity planned primarily for its psychological impact."12
Broadly defined, psychological operations are designed to influence the attitudes and perceptions and ultimately change the behavior of selected groups so their thoughts and actions favor the goals and objectives of the initiator. All PSYOP plans must begin with an ultimate objective or goal; an example of which, for this study, is "Defeat the Batista regime." This simple, concise statement is the impetus for the development of the plan that Castro implemented during the Revolution.
PSYOP objectives, then, are developed to lead to the accomplishment of the ultimate objective. Another example of a PSYOP objective for this operation would have been "Deter U.S. involvement in the Revolution." From this objective, target audiences could be determined, and sub-objectives could be formed that would help achieve this goal. The target audiences Castro selected were the U.S. press, U.S. policymakers, and the U.S. population in general, all of whom are important in helping Castro achieve his objectives.
Target audiences help the initiator focus on sub-PSYOP objectives that are based on the group's peculiarities. Messages and actions that are effective for one group might not be so for another; therefore, each target audience must be understood and targeted separately.13 Study of each target audience helps the planner determine the themes that will resonate with the target audience. An example of this is the Revolution's denial of any involvement with communism. This sub-objective would read: "Convince U.S. policymakers the Revolution is not communist based." Castro understood the reaction he would incite from U.S. policymakers if he did not make this denial. This theme also played across the spectrum of his target audiences because of U.S. sensitivities toward communist movements during the early Cold War years.
Finally, initiators design PSYOP programs to support each of their sub-objectives. This includes determining the type of media to use and when to use it; actions that when viewed by the target audience will cause a desired reaction; themes to stress and themes to avoid; and the frequency and timing of dissemination plans.
Castro's plan called for two PSYOP objectives that his cause needed to accomplish to defeat the Batista regime. First, the group had to convince fellow Cubans of the Revolution's legitimacy and that it could succeed. Second, they had to deter U.S. involvement in the Revolution. To achieve these objectives, they had to reach numerous audiences in and out of Cuba.
The Cubans that could influence the achievement of the revolutionaries' first objective were the population of Santiago de Cuba, the Guajiros in Oriente Province, Cuban youth movements, and the Cuban military. To achieve the second objective, they had to reach the U.S. press and population and U.S. de-cisionmakers.
Objective 1:
Convince the Cubans of the Revolution's legitimacy.
Target Audience: The Santiago de Cuba population, the Guajiros, Cuban youth movements, and the Cuban military.
The Santiago de Cuba population. Castro said, "No weapon, no force is capable of defeating a people who have decided to fight for their rights."14 Santiago de Cuba, located on the eastern end of Cuba near the Sierra Maestra Mountains in the Oriente Province, "is shut off from Havana as surely as if it were another country."15 Residents believed people from Havana looked on their city as backward, and they felt exploited by the Havana government.16 Santiagueros were proud, defiant, and antigovernment in general. Throughout Cuba's history, Santiago de Cuba served as a starting point for revolution. Castro recognized and exploited these qualities in choosing to attack the Moncada Army Barracks in 1953 and later during the Revolution when using the Sierra Maestra Mountains as his operational base. Castro's objectives were to increase the discontent among Santiago de Cuba's population; demonstrate the Rev-olution's strength and resolve to win; and encourage Santiagueros to support the Revolution.
Part of Castro's initial plan during the attack on the Moncada Army Barracks was to capture the local radio station so the rebels could use it to "call the people to revolt."17 The attempt to seize the radio station failed, but Castro followed up with a rallying cry for the Santiagueros during his trial defense. He repeatedly emphasized the atrocities committed against the population by the Batista regime. He described soldiers whose uniforms became butchers' aprons. He painted the Batista regime as the worst of all the oppressors of Cuba—a regime that purposely preyed on the Santiagueros, a peaceful, liberty-loving people. He described the deaths of innocent children at the hands of soldiers: "After the battle, they threw themselves like wild beasts on the city of Santiago de Cuba and on its defenseless population."18
Castro did not forget Santiago de Cuba as he launched his second attempt at revolution. He planned to coordinate his landing with an uprising in Santiago de Cuba through Frank País, the movement's leader in the city. The plan would make Santiago de Cuba "the rebel stronghold" of the Revolution.19 Because of the delay of Castro's landing, the synchronization that the plan called for never materialized. However, País did conduct an uprising and controlled the city in the name of the 26th of July movement for hours on the day of the planned landing.
País was instrumental in gaining support for the Revolution in Santiago de Cuba and was the key executor of propaganda in the city from the 1956 landing until his death in 1957. During a pro-Batista rally organized by Roland Masferrer on 18 May 1957, "País used a clandestine radio to cut into Masferrer's speech."20 País called for revolution and exalted Castro and his followers throughout the city, and the 26th of July movement gained support from the Santiagueros. The movement shipped arms through Santiago de Cuba and received medical treatment, shelter, and provisions in the city.
The Guajiros. The refuge for the rebels in the mountains consisted of "2,500 square miles and 50,000 Guajiros."21 The Guajiros can be described as "poor, illiterate black, white, and mulatto peasants" who lived in the villages and farms throughout the Sierra Maestra area.22 Most of them were squatters who cleared land for subsistence farming and built huts in which to live between sugar harvests. During harvests, they left their mountain homes and worked as sugarcane cutters. Castro understood that to survive in the mountains he needed the Guajiros' support. He had to convince them to support the 26th of July movement; to recruit them to join the Revolution; and to persuade them to inform the rebels of government action in the area.
Guevara served to motivate the Guajiros. In late 1957, with Castro's permission, Guevara began to build a small-scale infrastructure in his sector of the Sierra Maestra—El Hombrito. Guevara's action demonstrated to the local population the rebels' commitment to improving their lives. Guevara oversaw the construction of a small hospital, a bread oven, pig and poultry farms, a cigar factory, and a small armory.23 The guerrillas paid farmers to grow certain types of vegetables so the rebels could purchase them for subsistence. The benefit of seeing words transformed into actions served to steel the resolve of the Guajiros to support the rebels.
Guevara also established a newspaper and radio network to serve the area. The small newspaper, El Cubano Libre was copied on a mimeograph and distributed throughout the area.24 Articles written by Castro, Guevara, and others served to illustrate the ideology of the 26th of July movement and their plans for Cuba's future. The radio station started small, broadcasting only in the local area but widening its area as the war progressed: "When we began to broadcast from our own transmitter, the existence of our troops and their fighting determination became known throughout the Republic; our links began to become more extensive and complicated, even reaching Havana and Camagüey in the west, where we had important supply centers, and Santiago in the east."25 The results of the intensive campaign waged among the Guajiros served the rebels well. The network of supporters kept the rebels informed of "the presence of not only the Army but of any stranger" who entered the rebel zone.26 The combination of civil and military development provided a working model of the society the Revolution hoped to create.
The Batistas also targeted the Guajiros, but the strength of Castro's campaign prevented government inroads into the rebel zone. Castro was able to give the Guajiros hope, and the Guajiros gave Castro the time and support he needed for success.
Cuban youth movements. Another key group Castro targeted was Cuba's youth movements. Castro's objectives were to establish the legitimacy of the 26th of July movement to unite all revolutionary efforts and to convince youth movements that the main effort was in the Sierra Maestra Mountains.
Castro understood the importance of uniting all of the revolutionary movements throughout the island, and he began his campaign to do so even before the Moncada Barracks attack. On 23 July 1953, he released a manifesto declaring the philosophy of the Revolution to the Cuban people. The manifesto defined the vanguard of the Revolution as "a youth that wants a new Cuba, a youth that has freed itself from all the faults, the mean ambitions, and the sins of the past."27
Castro continued efforts to unite Cuban youth movements during his time in Mexico. In September 1956, he and José Antonio Echevarría, the leader of the University Federation of Students (FEU), signed the Mexico pact that united the revolutionary efforts of these two powerful organizations.28 Point 16 of the pact reads: "The FEU and the 26th of July movement adopt as their watchword the unity of all the revolutionary, moral, and civic forces of the nation—students, workers, youth organizations, and all men of dignity—so that they will support us in this struggle which will end in our victory or our death."29 Thus, on the eve of Castro's invasion, unity with a powerful youth organization took shape and legitimized the 26th of July movement in the eyes of other youth movements throughout Cuba.
The Cuban military. Castro's embrace of a soldier as Castro left his prison cell on the Isle of Pines was a symbol of his attempt to stop the military from participating in the violence directed by the Batista regime. Castro knew that if he could influence the Cuban military to support the Revolution by either joining him or, at least, not fighting him, he could rapidly achieve Batista's overthrow. The objectives he established to influence the military were to erode military support for Batista, stress the legitimacy of the 26th of July movement, and emphasize the inevitability of the military's defeat.
In June 1957, Batista began an all-out offensive against Castro that led to Castro being surrounded on a mountain crest near La Plata. With no more than 40 men, he and his men held their position, wearing down the attackers. Castro used this opportunity to apply tactical "psychological warfare for the first time in the Sierra war by installing loudspeakers that blared the national anthem, patriotic songs, and revolutionary exhortations at the exhausted Batista soldiers."30 Castro's force denied the military a victory at that decisive point.
Castro opened a dialogue with military commanders, and several exchanges illustrate his PSYOP objective of eroding support to the regime. To General Eulogio Cantillo he wrote, "I appreciate your noble feeling toward us, who are, after all, your compatriots, not your enemies because we are not at war with the armed forces, but against the dictatorship."31 During the battle of Mompie, Castro fought against a former law student colleague, Major José Quevedo. Castro reportedly held a dialogue with Quevedo guaranteeing the good treatment of the soldiers if they surrendered. After several days of this, Quevedo surrendered. The rebels fed Quevedo's soldiers before turning them over to the International Red Cross.32
Castro's humane treatment of his prisoners of war served to legitimize his fighting force in the eyes of his armed adversary. As Castro's army marched across the island in 1958, Cuban military commanders could not rally their troops to fight the rebels. One commander cautioned his soldiers not to be impressed "by what `Fidel Castro's radio station and his propaganda organs—or the ill-born Cubans who propagate rumors—may say.'"33 Castro's campaign against Cuban Armed Forces was effective and greatly hastened his march to victory.
Objective 2:
Deter U.S. involvement in the Revolution.
Target Audience: The U.S. press and population and U.S. decisionmakers.
U.S. press and population. Castro possessed a radio in the Sierra Maestra Mountains, which allowed him to monitor Cuban broadcasts and U.S. broadcasts from Florida. He knew that to further the Revolution, he had to get the right message out so the international press and, more important, the U.S. press would not disregard the rebellion in Cuba. His contacts led him to Herbert L. Matthews, a Latin America expert for The New York Times, who conducted an interview of Castro in Cuba. Matthews' interview became a three-part series of articles about the Cuban revolt and, more important, Castro, its leader. Allowing Americans to see his ideas in print would lend legitimacy to Castro's cause, as would his denial of it being a communist-based revolution. "Above all," he said, "we are fighting for a democratic Cuba and an end to the dictatorship."34
Matthew's articles had a de-legitimizing effect on the Batista regime. After Cuban officials challenged the validity of the story, The New York Times responded by publishing a photograph of Matthews and Castro together in the Sierra Maestra Mountains.35 The effect of Matthews' article was invaluable to Castro.
Castro presented to Matthews a force that appeared to be well organized. Nothing could have been further from the truth. Castro said his army "works in groups of 10 to 40," and, he further stated that he had "no less than 50" rifles with telescopes that Cuban soldiers feared.36 The reality of the situation was that at the time Castro's army numbered "less than 20 armed men."37
Matthews's articles were filled with admiration for Castro and his cause. As a result, U.S. attention turned toward the Cuban situation. Mat-thews' scoop opened the floodgates, and U.S. journalists hastily tried to reach the Cuban rebels. Money, recruits, and support flowed to the Sierra Maestra.
Such interviews allowed Castro to publicly separate himself from Cuba's communist movement. He understood that U.S. citizens, decision-makers, and the U.S. press needed to hear his denial of communist affiliation for themselves. Anticommunist sentiment in the U.S. was strong during the late 1950s, and Americans would oppose any rebellion with communist connections. If Castro convinced the U.S. press that his movement was not communist, he also would be able to reach other important target audiences.
Castro convinced Matthews that his group had no links to the communists. The second article in the series focused on the rebels' anti-dictatorial stance and, more important, for the rebels, the separation of the movement from the communists: "Communism has little to do with opposition to the regime. There is a well-trained, hard core of communists that is doing as much mischief as it can and that naturally bolsters all the opposition elements, but there is no communism to speak of in Fidel Castro's 26th of July movement or the disaffected elements in the Army."38
Castro continued to distance his movement from the communist movement before the U.S. press. In a February 1958 Look magazine interview, Andrew St. George questioned Castro on charges that the Revolution was communist-inspired.39 Castro credited Matthews with discrediting this claim and stated that "the Cuban communists, as your journalist John Gunther once reported, have never opposed Batista, for whom they have seemed to feel a close kinship."40 Castro not only denied the charges, he attempted to link Batista with the communist movement.
In a letter to the U.S. policy journal The Nation, Castro summarizes the programs of the 26th of July movement that the rebels would implement when they won. The program is outlined in six paragraphs, with paragraph 5 addressing the international affairs of the proposed government: "In international affairs, the establishment of close solidarity with the democratic nations of the American continents."41 Again, through the U.S. press, Castro attempted to demonstrate his distance from the communist movement.
Before Matthews' interview, the Cuban press covered mostly articles about the resort atmosphere of Havana, and the Cuban government did a fairly good job of controlling the stories that left the island. Entries in the Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature focused on how Americans could vacation cheaply in Havana, of the visits of high-profile celebrities to the island, and so on.42 After Matthew's interview, Reader's Guide articles focused on rebel demands and interviews with Castro, which kept the Revolution on the front pages of the U.S. press.
U.S. decisionmakers. Castro had to convince U.S. decisionmakers that the movement was not communist. He had to persuade them to stop shipping small arms and planes to Cuba, and he wanted to dissuade them from intervening in the Revolution.
Castro's programs with regard to the U.S. press, concerning the movement's political goals, also served to affect U.S. decisionmakers. Castro's public rejection of communism was reflected in correspondence, dated 7 December 1957, between the U.S. Department of State and U.S. American Embassy policy officer Wayne Smith. Smith wrote: "The Cuban Government accuses Castro of being a communist, but has not produced evidence to substantiate the charge."43 Castro's campaign of distancing himself from communism was reaching his intended audience.
Castro, no stranger to Cuban history, was well aware that the United States believed it had a legitimate reason to intervene in Cuban politics. He had to maintain a delicate balance of fighting against a demonstrably illegitimate dictator, while simultaneously not offending the United States enough to cause intervention in Cuban affairs. Part of the program to reduce the chances of U.S. intervention was the anticommunist rhetoric he spouted. Matthews wrote that Castro "has strong ideas of liberty, democracy, social justice, the need to restore the constitution, to hold elections."44 In the interview, Castro said, "We are fighting for a democratic Cuba and an end to the dictatorship."45 In the Look interview, Castro said, "Under our constitution, I am far too young to be a candidate."46 The ideals that Castro presented through the press to the U.S. public made it difficult for U.S. decisionmakers to justify an intervention on Batista's behalf.
Lessons Learned
Examining Castro's propaganda effort is valuable for the PSYOP specialist because it illustrates the effectiveness of a well-planned, flexible plan. The most important aspect of the effort was never losing sight of the mission, in this case the overthrow of the Batista regime. Propaganda can take on a life of its own, but Castro was able to direct his program to support his objectives at all times. Incidentally, the program Castro successfully executed parallels current U.S. PSYOP doctrine, illustrating the soundness of these principles.
Castro's successful propaganda campaign also was due to his understanding of target audiences and his sense of timing in applying the art of PSYOP. Castro quickly responded to U.S. concerns when his brother kidnapped U.S. citizens. He could have chosen that moment to demonstrate the movement's increased strength, but he stuck with his goal of avoiding U.S. intervention, understanding that the kidnappings would only serve to anger his northern neighbor.
PSYOP officers must also examine the propaganda Castro conducted in the sense of a potential adversarial PSYOP effort. The program Castro followed could easily be replicated in today's information-age environment. The advances in media technology actually would assist a guerrilla effort in gaining, or preventing, international support. One only has to look at propaganda efforts by Philippine and Colombian insurgents exploiting the Internet to sense the possibilities available to potential adversaries.
Epilogue
On 3 January 1959, Cuban revolutionary commander Fidel Castro began his "long march on the central highway from Santiago to Havana."47 The march was a move to gain the popular support of the people as the column crossed the island. Mounted on a captured tank, Castro addressed Cubans at various stops along the way. People clamored for this "liberator." Castro used these opportunities to spell out what Cuba's future should look like, and he promised to "punish those who have been responsible for so many years of suffering."48
Castro arrived in Havana on 8 January 1959. He gave his respects to the president he had appointed, Manuel Urrutia Lleó, and gave a speech to the thousands of people gathered there. Castro, elevated to legendary status, received the monikers "Savior of the Fatherland" and "The Maximum Leader." He had achieved his goal—the overthrow of Batista. His use of propaganda enabled him to achieve that goal in the face of seemingly insurmountable odds: "We cannot become dictators; we shall never need to use force because we have the people, and because the people shall judge, and because the day the people want, I shall leave."49 MR
1.Accounts vary on the number of survivors from La Granma, although there is no number less than 12 or greater than 20. In several press interviews, Castro gives the number as 12. Maps that show Castro's movements from 1956 through 1959 can be accessed online at <www.rose-hulman.edu/~delacova/cuban-revolution.htm>.
2.Fidel Castro, Revolutionary Struggle, eds., E. Rolando Bonachea and Nelson P. Valdes (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1972), 40.
3.Ibid., 37.
4.Ibid., 53. Raul Castro was part of the group that attacked the barracks.
5.Enrique Menses, Fidel Castro (New York: Taplinger Publishing Company, 1966).
6.U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 33-5, Psychological Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO), superceded).
7.U.S. Joint Publication (JP) 3-53, Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations (Washington, DC: GPO, 10 July 1996).
8.JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington, DC: GPO, 12 April 2001).
9.FM 3-05.30, Psychological Operations (Washington, DC: GPO, 19 January 2000).
10.Ibid., glossary.
11.Ibid., glossary.
12.JP 1-02.
13.This statement does not mean that some messages and actions do not cross target audiences. In fact, many messages might, and often do, cross target audiences. Only by studying each target audience individually can one determine if this will happen and how to plan for it.
14.Castro, 182.
15.Herbert L. Matthews, "Cuban Rebel is Visited in Hideout," The New York Times, 24 February 1957, 1.
16.Menses, 22.
17.Castro, 50.
18.Ibid., 197.
19.Ramon L. Bonachea and Marta San Martin, The Cuban Insurrection, 1952-1959 (Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1974), 79.
20.Ibid., 140.
21.Menses, 46.
22.Jon Lee Anderson, Che Guevara: A Revolutionary Life (New York: Grove Press, 1997), 220.
23.Ibid., 287.
24.Ernesto "Che" Guevara, Reminiscences of the Cuban Revolutionary War (New York and London: Monthly Review Press, 1968), 205.
25.Ibid., 207.
26.Ibid.
27.Castro, 157.
28.The FEU founded the Directorio Revolucionario (DR) in September 1955 as an answer to Castro's revolutionary movement. The DR formed the nucleus of the urban guerrillas in Havana.
29.Castro, 339.
30.Tad Szulc, Fidel (New York: William Morrow and Co., Inc., 1986), 447.
31.Ibid.
32.Ibid., 447-48.
33.Bonachea, 272.
34.Matthews, Cuban Rebel is Visited, 1.
35.Ibid, photo.
36.Ibid., 34.
37.Anderson, 236.
38.Matthews, "Rebel Strength Gaining in Cuba, But Batista has the Upper Hand," The New York Times (25 February 1957), 11.
39.Andrew St. George, "Interview with Fidel Castro," Look (4 February 1958), 30.
40.Ibid.
41.Castro, "What Cuba's Rebels Want," The Nation (30 November 1957), 400.
42.Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature.
43.John P. Glennon, ed., Foreign Relations of the United States: 1955-1957, vol. VI, American Republics: Multilateral; Mexico; Caribbean (Washington, DC: GPO, 1963), 866.
44.Matthews, "Cuban Rebel is Visited," 34.
45.Ibid.
46.St. George.
47.Bonachea, 326.
48.Ibid.
49.Ibid., 330. See also online John T. Skelly, "The Men Who Left the 26th of July Movement," www.sigloxxi.org/menleft. htm.
Major Russell J. Hampsey, U.S. Army, is a Psychological Operations Officer at USSOCOM. He received a B.A. from East Stroudsburg University, an M.S. from Troy State University, and he is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.